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The acquisition of new weapon systems is a long and expensive process. Test
and Evaluation is a critical and costly step in that process. Model-Test-Model
(MTM) is an emerging operations research technique that can improve efficiency and
effectiveness of weapon system evaluation. For example, MTM can be used to
predict whether a given test scenario will yield significant results.
The goal of this thesis is to
(1) examine the suitability of proposed scenarios for comparing the existing
antiarmor system, Dragon versus the proposed system, Javelin;
(2) compare the weapon systems according to approved measures of
effectiveness (MOE) and,
(3) identify potential additional test conditions which may cause significant
changes in the MOE.
The pre-test model using Janus(A), a high resolution, combat simulation will
impact on the operational test of the weapon systems occurring in September 1993.
Although M-T-M is a DOD approved construct, limited experiments have been done.
This thesis is unique because it explores for the first time, using MTM, an
infantry weapon system with approved scenarios and MOE; secondly, this thesis has
been delivered in time to impact on the Operational Test and Evaluation plan. The
results will directly benefit Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) in
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The acquisition of new weapon systems is a long and expensive process. Test
and Evaluation is a critical and costly step in that process. [Ref. 1, Ref. 2]
Model-Test-Model is a relatively new concept being promoted as an operations
research technique by which DoD can conduct more efficient and effective test and
evaluation of proposed weapon systems as well as improve the validity of existing
modeling tools or identify needed improvements. [Ref. 3, Ref. 4]
Model-Test-Model (MTM) consists of three phases. The first phase examines
the proposed experimental design of the test in order to identify possible efficiencies
in and effectiveness improvements of that design. [Ref. 3] To date only limited
pre-test modeling of proposed or new weapon systems have been conducted prior to
actual testing. This limited pre-test modeling included an Air Defense weapon
system and an Armor weapon system, but never to the level of fidelity of Infantry
weapon systems. [Ref. 5, Ref. 6] Additionally, even though some pre-test modeling
has been done, none of the pre-test modeling results have been conducted in time
to impact on the actual experimental design. As such, a chasm exists between the
theoretical impact ofMTM and empirical proof that existing modeling tools have the
capability to accomplish these aims.
This thesis explores the suitability of pre-test MTM concepts for an infantry
weapon system. Secondly this thesis investigates the possible impact pre-test
modeling would have on the experimental design of the operational test of U.S.
Army's current Medium Antitank Weapon system, Dragon versus a proposed
replacement - Javelin. The test is scheduled in 1993 at Fort Hunter-Liggett,
California. In order to address these objectives, this research applies MTM concepts
using Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) developed scenarios.
Janus(A), the Army's principal combined arms, interactive, high resolution model is
the tool used to generate research data. [Ref. 7] The data for the two weapon
systems are evaluated according to three critical Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
which are based on Critical Operational Issues and Criteria (COIC) of the test. [Ref.
8]
B. ISSUES
In regards to the suitability of MTM concepts the specific issue addressed in
this research is whether or not the representations of Infantry actions in Janus(A) are
a realistic portrayal of corresponding actual Infantry actions. This issue will be
addressed primarily through a literature search and discussion of applicable Infantry
tactics and their corresponding representation in Janus(A). In regards to the
efficiency and effectiveness of the experimental design, specific issues to be addressed
include:
(1) whether or not the proposed scenarios are plausible and facilitate
examination of the differences between the competing weapon systems, and
(2) identification of additional issues which could impact on the
efficiency/effectiveness of the test design and employment of the weapon
system.
C. BACKGROUND ON INFANTRY ANTIARMOR SYSTEMS
From the late 1960'sthe Army developed the Light Antitank Weapon (LAW),
Medium Antitank Weapon (MAW) and Heavy Antitank Weapon (HAW) doctrine
for infantry forces to combat enemy armored vehicles and weapon systems. The
LAW is a short-range, light- weight weapon that a soldier carries in addition to his
primary or assigned weapon. The LAW evolved from the M-72, a 66 milli-meter
rocket with an approximate 200 meter range to the current AT-4 which has a larger
84 millimeter high explosive projectile and a greater 300 meter range. [Ref. 9]
Figure 1 Law Gunner in Action
The HAW is a heavy or crew-served weapon system. Its nomenclature is the
TOW II (Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire Command Link Guided) missile.
Although the TOW II can be ground-mounted, it is usually vehicle mounted. In
mechanized units the TOW II is mounted on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the
Improved TOW Vehicle. It is mounted on the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) in light infantry units and Cobra Attack Helicopters in aviation
units. It has a range of 3750 meters and a thermal night sight. [Ref. 9] The TOW
II warhead has been modified to defeat reactive armor.
Figure 2 TOW Mounted on HMMWV
The current MAW is the Dragon. It is man-carried and is the primary
antiarmor weapon system at platoon and company level. The Dragon's guidance
system is similar to the TOW in that it is optically sighted, command-link
wire-guided. It has a 1000 meter range and a thermal night sight. [Ref. 9]
Presently the Dragon gunner is required to guide a relatively slow-moving
missile to the target. The range of most enemy tank main gun and heavy machine
gun is 1500 - 1800 meters. Therefore, the Dragon gunner remains exposed for up
to 11 seconds within the enemy's engagement range. This assumes the Dragon
gunner fires at maximum engagement range. Even using proper flank and rear shot
tactics, the gunner is still at risk. Also, improved armor has degraded the weapon's
lethality. Given the deficiencies of limited range, gunner vulnerabilities, and eroded
lethality, changes in tactics have not been able to sufficiently address the mission
need. [Ref. 11]
Figure 3 Dragon Gunner Sighting Target
Javelin is under development to address the cited deficiencies. The Advanced
Antitank Weapon System - Medium (AAWS-M) or the Javelin is designed to have
an extended range of up to 2200 meters. Javelin is designated as a fire and forget
weapon system which permits a gunner to acquire a target, fire on the target and
immediately resume a covered and concealed position. The Javelin's guidance
system is based on an infrared imagery seeker. The Javelin's missile when launched
travels more than two times faster than the Dragon. Because the Javelin has a top-
attack mode as well as a direct line of sight capability its inherent lethality is
increased. Theoretically, a top-attack mode permits the missile to penetrate a




Although Department of Defense policy for applying modeling and simulation
in support of Operational Test and Evaluation has been in existence since 1989,
MTM as presently applied is a relatively new concept. The MTM concept applies
modeling directly in support of the operational test and evaluation process. This
concept envisions the synergistic interaction of testing and modeling in order to
positively impact both operational testing and the combined arms modeling process.
Mr. Hollis, Deputy Under Secretary of Army for Operations Research,
approved and directed that additional MTM concepts be incorporated into Army
Test and Evaluation Policy in 1991. [Ref. 3, Ref. 4] Since then DOD has also
approved MTM. [Ref. 14, Ref. 15] MTM has three distinct phases. The first phase
is pre-test modeling which simulates proposed test scenarios. The objective of
pre-test modeling is to develop an efficient and effective experimental design.
Pre-test modeling iteratively refines and adjusts the test design in order to balance
test objectives with test costs.
The second phase is the test phase. While testing is conducted, modelers
observe trials and data collection methods. Particular attention is given to definition
of each data collection step in order to insure test data corresponds to model data.
The post test modeling phase focuses on examining the degree of association
between model and test results. Normally this examination entails fixing selective
parameters while statistically evaluating the association of repetitive modeling trials
with corresponding test trials. This phase can also be used to extend test results
beyond the tested scenarios and conditions. The rationale behind extending test
results is to gain insight into the utility of the proposed weapon system where active
testing costs may be prohibitive or testing constrained by safety or environmental
consideration. One caution, however, is the further the extension or extrapolation
is from the calibration points the less credible the model results may become.
The M1A2 tank and the Line of Sight Forward Heavy (LOSF-H), an air
defense artillery system, have been partially evaluated under the MTM Concept.
Both the LOSF-H and M1A2 were considered in a post-test evaluation. Pre-test
modeling on the M1A2 was done with notional scenarios and MOE's. [Ref. 5, Ref.
6]
:
This MTM thesis research on the Javelin is unique for many reasons. It
represents the first infantry system in the test and evaluation process to be explored
using MTM. Secondly, this research represents the first time actual scenarios, terrain
and measures of effectiveness will be used in the pre-test modeling of the operational
test. Finally, this thesis represents the first time pre-test modeling will be conducted
in time to impact on the actual test design.
B. DESCRIPTION OF JANUS(A)
The simulation used to conduct the pretest model is Janus(A). Janus is named
for the Roman god who was the guardian of portals and the patron of beginnings and
endings. Janus(A) is an interactive, two-sided, closed, stochastic, combined arms
simulation. Interactive refers to decision making during the simulation or
man-in-the-loop. Two-sided refers to two opposing forces. Closed means that
opposing force distributions information is limited. Stochastic refers to the
problematic way results such as direct fire engagements are determined. Combined
arms means the principal focus is on combined arms forces and maneuver. Janus(A)
also models weather, visibility, chemical environment, mines and any other combat
variables. Terrain is depicted with contour lines, vegetation, roads, waters and urban
areas. Theoretically terrain is represented by cells which correspond to Defense
Mapping Agency elevation, vegetation, and cultural feature description. Graphic
symbols represent one or more systems and each system has one or more weapons.
For example the symbol for an infantryman may represent a nine man squad where
each infantryman carries an M-16 rifle and a light antitank weapon. Combat
between systems in the Janus simulation is initiated based on a standard Army
detection algorithm for weapon system sensor capabilities. In addition to limitations
imposed by sensor system capability, detections occur only if physical line of sight
exists between the sensor and the target. If a system has line of sight, can range the
target, has ammunition, and is not in hold-fire status, then the system fires the most
appropriate weapon system at the target. Appendix A shows a photograph of a
Janus(A) display. The simulation resolves engagements by comparing random
number draws to a probability of hit and kill database. Postprocessing files allow
extensive data collection on the detection and engagement process. [Ref. 12]
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m. SCENARIOS/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Essential to any research on the suitability of MTM concepts for Infantry
Weapon Systems is development of realistic scenarios which employ those weapons.
TEXCOM - developed scenarios for the Initial Operational Test (IOT) of the Javelin
provide the basis of the scenarios evaluated in this research. The scenarios examined
in the model and the scenarios scheduled for conduct during the test correspond.
The scenarios vary tactically and fall into offensive and defensive operations.
Modeled scenarios include hasty defense, deliberate defense, deliberate attack and
movement to contact/hasty attack (MTC). Conditions in these scenarios are
systematically varied. Conditions include day operations with and without Mission
Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) equipment. Because Javelin has a long wave
Infrared Sight, differences in the sensor between day and night conditions in the
model are minimal. Further, night parameter data on Dragon/Javelin was not
available for modeling given the time constraints of this thesis.
MOPP conditions vary for each scenario. Hence MOPP levels are factored into
the Janus(A) modeling process. MOPP refers to the protective overgarments to
include boots, gloves and mask that soldiers wear in a Nuclear, Biological or
Chemical (NBC) contaminated area. A higher MOPP level reduces soldier
effectiveness and increases reaction time. In MOPP4 soldiers wear protective
clothing as well as a mask for a simulated NBC environment. For this research, the
11
MOPP level for the hasty defense in this analysis is MOPP4. The other three
scenarios were modeled in MOPPO. The deliberate defense, deliberate attack and
MTC scenarios were modeled under daylight conditions.
Modeled force sizes correspond with projected force sizes for the operational
test. For the scenarios modeled this was platoon size blue forces and company size
red forces for the hasty and deliberate defenses. For the deliberate attack and MTC,
company size blue forces and platoon size red forces were modeled. It is also
important to note the blue platoons and companies modeled are light or dismounted
infantry. A blue platoon consists of 30 soldiers organized in three squads. Each
platoon possesses two Dragon/Javelin Antitank weapons (MAW), two M-60 machine
guns, six Squad Assault Weapons or light machine guns, 12 M-203 grenade
launchers, and eight M-16 rifles. Each rifleman also carries 2 AT-4's. Each blue
company is made up of three platoons. The blue force sizes and Dragon/Javelin
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The red force company possess three T-72 tanks and eight BMP mechanized
infantry fighting vehicles for a total of 1 1 vehicles. Red force platoons possess two
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The MOE's considered are derived from the TEXCOM Critical Operational
Issues and Criteria (COIC) selected for the Initial Operation Test which will occur
in September 1993 at Fort Hunter-Liggett, California.
They are as follows:
- Engagement Range
- average engagement range in meters
- Lethality
- tt kills/it shots fired
- Survivability
- friendly soldiers surviving/
# friendly soldiers starting
The MOE's above were selected for a number of reasons. First, they are
directly addressed in COIC. They are quantifiable and easily derived from Janus(A)
post-processing files. Other MOE's included in the COIC but not included in this
13
research have less to do with the weapon system and more to do with the gunner.
Examples include performance by soldiers with selected fitness scores or suitability
criteria concerning manpower and personal integration (MANPRINT). These
issues/MOE's cannot be described adequately in Janus at this time and if included
would cloud weapon versus weapon comparison.
Another condition examined within the context of this thesis is basic load. This
is not a condition that is addressed in the TEXCOM MOE or measures of
performance, but may impact on COIC's such as Lethality and Survivability. Basic
load is the number of rounds available per weapon system for a given scenario. Basic
load varies according to mission as well as preparation time. For an offensive
operation a Dragon/Javelin gunner will carry the weapon sight/launch unit and one
round and the assistant gunner will carry a spare round. In the defensive operations,
preparation time for a hasty defense is less than 24 hours. The unit may be limited
to the rounds available in the platoon or what is in the company trains which may
range from three to five. In the deliberate defense with 24-72 hours to prepare the
company has time to resupply rounds from the battalion trains and up the basic load
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Preparation time impacts on other differences in hasty and deliberate defenses.
Soldiers in a deliberate defense may have more or better obstacle plans as well as
better prepared fighting positions which offer greater survivability. The differences
between a deliberate attack and a MTC have to do with amount of intelligence
known about the enemy's location and disposition. In a deliberate attack a unit
knows the enemy's disposition and location and therefore can plan and execute
protected routes to the enemy's location. In a MTC a unit is trying to find the
enemy to make contact and destroy him. The chosen scenarios and conditions offer
a broad cross-section of missions for the system to be tested. Imbedding the system
into unit level operations will produce more relevant data for analysis.
15
IV. DISCUSSION OF SUITABILITY OF JANUS(A) REPRESENTATION
Janus(A) is similar to operational testing for direct fire engagements. Janus(A)
uses line-of-sight algorithms while tests use lasers attached to the weapon. In both
simulation and reality the firing system must have an unobstructed line-of-sight to the
target to register a hit. In Janus(A), Infantry soldiers are represented as standing
upright when they are moving. In reality soldiers crawl or move in crouched
positions as well as upright. The inability of Janus(A) to model various individual
soldier movements is overshadowed by the level of resolution in its terrain modeling.
At present the finest degree for terrain resolution is 12.5 meter grids or squares. In
Janus(A), soldiers in defensive positions can be in full or partial defilade. If a soldier
is in full defilade he and his weapon cannot detect targets or fire at them. Real
fighting positions fully prepared provide cover, concealment and overhead protection.
Therefore a soldier with an antitank weapon could actually fire from a full defilade
position. Janus(A) can be run interactively or non-interactively. For this
research Janus(A) scenarios were allowed to run non-interactively. This means
systems did not deviate from their original preplanned route of advance or direction
of attack. A more realistic approach might be a man-in —the- loop so that the battle
can be fought by reactive or thinking opponents. The reason the simulated battles
were not fought interactively was to vary as few parameters as possible. Therefore
the data generated for the MOE's was primarily weapon dependent and not man-in-
16
the-loop dependent. Secondly, the stopping criteria for either side was reaching their
march objective. A designated level of casualties sustained is another stopping
criteria that may have more reasonably modeled reality. The march objective
stopping criteria was selected because it was consistent and could be repeated for
analytical purposes. It also generated a larger data population which gives more
robustness to the analysis. Kills given hits in Janus(A) are binary in nature. Once
a hit is generated it is selected as a casualty or suppression. Categorical kills for
vehicles such as catastrophic, mobility and weapon system may represent reality
more closely, but are not available in Janus(A). As previously mentioned Janus(A)
does not allow systems to fire from a full defilade position. The system can be
changed interactively from full to partial defilade so the system can fire. This
artificiality may cause a slight degradation in survivability in the model not found in
the test. These modeling issues need to be addressed to close the gap between
simulation and reality but the important issue of survivability is one of detection and
accurate probability of hit/probability of kill (ph/pk). It is important to note that the
actual ph/pk' s for all weapon systems used as input are not included to keep the
thesis unclassified. The detection algorithm in Janus(A) has been validated in other
studies. The ph/pk's are generated by analysis done at TRADOC Analysis
Command at Monterey and will be refined with input from other Army agencies and
as further testing is completed.
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V. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. METHODOLOGY
In order to examine whether or not the proposed scenarios are plausible and
facilitate examining the differences between the competing weapon systems, five
Janus(A) runs were conducted for each weapon system for all scenarios under the
varied conditions. Although only five runs were made, the analysis represents from
30-60 total data points for each MOE. Means of these data points represent each
of the five runs.
The basic analytical objective is to determine if the proposed scenarios revealed
a statistical difference between the two weapon systems given the same scenarios.
A number of analytical tools were used to evaluate data resulting from this
research. The first analytical tool used is notched box and whisper plots. Box plots
provide useful information about location, dispersion and skewness. A notch is
added to each box corresponding to a confidence interval around the median, while
the width of the box is proportional to the square root of the number of observations
in the data set. [Ref. 18, Ref. 19] Pair wise comparisons are made between the
weapon systems by examining whether the notches overlap. The next tool used is
One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). This technique assumes normality, a
common variance and independent samples. The hypothesis testing for each MOE
varies according to scenario.
18
In each case the hypothesis tested were:
H : M, = M2
H
a
: M, £ M2
Where:
M, = mean of Dragon for each MOE
M2 = mean of Javelin for each MOE
Next Bartletts test is used to test for common variance between the Dragon and
Javelin. See Appendix B.
Finally the Kruskal-Wallis One Way Analysis by Ranks is used. This
nonparametric technique is chosen because it makes no assumptions concerning
shape and location parameters and thus provides robustness to analytical analysis
performed.
B. RESULTS
1. Hasty Defense in MOPP4.
- Average Engagement Range: Analysis of notched box plots for the
hasty defense in MOPP4 indicates the range for the Javelin is more than double the
Dragon's range. The Javelin's median for average engagement range is
approximately 1970 meters while the Dragon's median is approximately 960 meters.
Little deviation exists from the median for both weapon systems. This is reasonable
because both weapon systems have optimal fields of fire and will fire close to their
maximum engagement ranges. The ANOVA and KW values support differences in
19




- Lethality: Lethality remains under 35% for the Dragon while the
Javelin ranges from 80- 100% with the median near 100%. What appears to be an
outlier for the Dragon is a valid data point representing six engagements. The
lethality of 49% is slightly higher than the median but within the Dragon's ph/pk.
The ANOVA and KW tests support rejection of the null hypothesis of equal
means/means of rank. See Figure 6 and Table 4.
Figure 6
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- Survivability: There is no significant difference between the weapon
systems in survivability. The Dragon's median is approximately 93% while the
Javelin's median is around 90% with an extremely wide confidence interval. ANOVA
and KW results show no differences in the weapon systems. See Figure 7 and Table
4.
Figure 7







Range 46076.1 .0000 6.859 .0088
Lethality 115.193 .0000 7.500 .0062
Survivability .334 .5852 .1895 .6633
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2. Deliberate Defense.
- Average Engagement Range: As occurred for Hasty Defense in
MOPP4 the medians of average engagement range are statistically different between
the weapon systems in deliberate defense. The Dragon's median is 950 meters and
the Javelin's is just under 2000 meters. ANOVA and KW analysis support differences
between the weapons. See Figure 8 and Table 5.
Figure 8
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- Lethality: Median for the Dragon's lethality is approximately 50%
while the Javelin is over 95 % . ANOVA and KW results support differences between
the Dragon and Javelin to a five percent level of significance. For this scenario there
appears to be an outlier for the Javelin below the median. Due to the randomness
of the simulation fewer first round hits were scored on that run but it remains a valid
data point. See Figure 9 and Table 5.
Figure 9
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- Survivability: Median for the Dragon is around 93% while the median
for the Javelin is 100%. The confidence intervals do not overlap thus showing
differences in the medians for the weapons. ANOVA and KW values support the
alternative hypothesis that the means/means of rank are not equal. The survivability
is a constant 100% for the Javelin because the blue force possessed enough rounds
to destroy all enemy vehicles before they were able to kill any blue soldiers. See
Figure 10 and Table 5.
Figure 10
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Range 14514.2 .0000 6.818 .0090
Lethality 42.885 .0002 7.031 .0080
Survivability 23.929 .0012 7.867 .0050
3. Deliberate Attack.
- Average Engagement Range: Analysis of the deliberate attack
scenarios indicate that the medians are different. Median for the Dragon is 750
meters and the Javelin is just over 1700 meters. ANOVA and One Way Analysis of






















- Lethality: Medians for lethality are dissimilar. The Dragon's median
is under 25% while the Javelin's is 50%. Again their confidence intervals do not
overlap. Their ANOVA and KW values display differences to a five percent level
of significance. See Figure 12 and Table 6.
Figure 12
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- Survivability: The medians for survivability are distinct. The Dragon's
is 81% and the Javelin's is 97%. ANOVA and KW analysis support differences to a
five percent level of significance. See Figure 13 and Table 6.
Figure 13










Range 525.526 .0000 6.818 .0090
Lethality 7.374 .0264 4.930 .0263
Survivability 6.989 .0295 4.645 .0311
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4. Movement to Contact.
- Average Engagement Range: Analysis of the Movement to Contact
scenarios show significant differences for the medians. The Dragon's median is
approximately 960 meters while the Javelin's is close to 1720 meters. ANOVA and
KW analysis support dissimilar means/means of rank for the weapon systems. See
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Figure 14
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- Lethality: Medians for lethality are statistically unique. The Dragon's
lethality is under 25% while Javelin's is 65%. ANOVA and KW analysis reject the
equality of means and means of rank. See Figure 15 and Table 7.
Figure 15
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- Survivability: The survivability for the two weapon systems are again
statistically different. The Dragon's median is under 60% while the Javelin's is
approximately 98%. Values for ANOVA and KW reject similarities to a five percent
level of significance. See Figure 16 and Table 7.
Figure 16










Range 331.679 .0000 6.818 .0090
Lethality 9.863 .0138 4.961 .0259
Survivability 36.295 .0003 6.859 .0088
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5. Hasty Defense in MOPP4 with Increased Basic Load
- Average Engagement Range: Results of the Hasty Defense in MOPP4
with Increased Basic Load display dissimilarities in the medians in the weapon
systems for average engagement range. The Dragon's median is approximately 960
meters and the Javelin's median is 1980 meters. ANOVA and KW analysis support
differences between the means and means of rank to a five percent level of
significance. See Figure 17 and Table 8.
Figure 17
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- Lethality: Differences in the medians are again apparent. The
Dragon's median is 30% and the Javelin's is 80%. ANOVA and KW also show




- Survivability: There are statistical differences between the medians of
the weapons. The Dragon's median survivability is 90% while the Javelin's is
approximately 93%. From ANOVA and KW analysis, their means/means of rank
are dissimilar to a ten percent level of significance. See Figure 19 and Table 8.
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P - Value Test
Statistic
P - Value
Range 354766 .0000 6.944 .0084
Lethality 6250 .0000 9.000 .0026
Survivability 4.234 .0736 4.033 .0446
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6. Trends.
Given the terrain modeled in Janus, analysis supports the assumptions that
the current operational tests planned for the MAW will support determining
differences between the competing weapons systems. Pretest modeling indicates that
across all scenarios and conditions average engagement range for the Javelin remains
over two times that of the Dragon. For defensive operations the Dragon's lethality
varies from 35%-50% while Javelin's lethality varies from 80%-100%. Lethality is
lower in offensive operations. It varies from 22%-28% for the Dragon and 50%-65%
for the Javelin. The lower lethality for offensive operations is intuitive because in
defensive operations the weapons' fields of fire are selected to maximize the tactical
advantage and therefore maximize lethality. In offensive operations the gunners
employ their weapon system at the point they detect the enemy and can engage the
target. That location may not necessarily have optimal fields of fire. Survivability
shows trends not only in offensive versus defensive operations but also shows
sensitivity to basic load. Javelin displays a greater survivability in the offensive
operations and as the basic load is varied in the defensive operations.
It is important to understand what the MOE ratios represent for lethality
and survivability. In the defensive operations the difference in survivability equates
to one to three soldiers lives per platoon or expanding to battalion level nine to
twenty-seven more soldiers survive. The number of lives saved is even more
staggering for the offensive operations. Fourteen to thirty more soldiers survive per
35
platoon. That represents almost a company at battalion level or one quarter of the
fighting force in a five company battalion.
As stated earlier, conservation of testing resources is as important today
as it has ever been. The pretest modeling results indicate close similarities between
the defensive operations - hasty defense with increased basic load and deliberate
defense, as well as the offensive operations - deliberate attack and movement to
contact. Using one defensive scenario and one offensive scenario is a consideration
which would reduce and streamline testing resources to include saving potentially
millions of dollars. [Ref. 20] This postulation only considers issues addressed in the
discussed MOE and not those of suitability.
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VI. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS
The first issue examined in this thesis is whether or not Janus(A) could
adequately represent the differences between the MAW systems. In other words, is
the model suitable for MAW MTM purposes. Such physics based issues as lethality,
range and speed of the round as well as velocity of dismounted soldiers and vehicles
are represented in Janus(A) adequately. Those attributes are simply data inputs.
Due to the lack of object representation in Janus, replication of reality in terms of
terrain and vegetation is not achieved in Janus. However, if the notion of
probabilistic representations of terrain and vegetation is acceptable, then the Janus
representation is acceptable. In that case, whether or not a soldier is exposed to fire
or not can be expressed in the probability of his detection. Of a smaller impact,
the difference between being able to acquire and fire from a full defilade position
is an issue that needs to be addressed if the model is to more nearly approach reality.
The second issue of whether the proposed scenarios are sufficient or effective
to examine the differences between the weapon systems is affirmed. Modeling the
TEXCOM weapon scenarios indicate that the differences in the weapon systems,
shown by the MOE, should result during the operational test. Using various analysis
tools to investigate the Medians, Means and Means of Rank all three support the
alternate hypothesis that the median/means/means of ranks of the MOE are
statistically different for the weapon systems. Engagement range, lethality and
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survivability for the deliberate defense, deliberate attack and movement to
contact/hasty attack are different to a five percent level of significance.
Basic load is a condition that surfaces as an identified issue which impacts
directly on one of the primary MOE - survivability. Survivability becomes significant
at a five percent level when the basic load was increased from three to five rounds
per system for the hasty defense in a Chemical/NBC environment. Hence, basic load
is an important issue identified by this analysis and not addressed in the COIC but
should be prior to the operational test. Based on the results of the initial pre-test
modeling in Janus(A) the given scenarios and MOE are acceptable to show
differences in the weapon systems if the systems are employed on the same or similar
terrain at Fort Hunter — Liggett, which maximizes the capabilities of the weapon
systems. Finally, this thesis considered reduction of the scheduled testing for possible
test savings. The pre-test modeling results show enough similarities between the two
defensive scenarios and offensive scenarios so that the operational test could be
streamlined to make it more efficient.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A is a color copy of the Janus(A) screen display. It represents terrain
from Fort Hunter Liggett, California and is a platoon deliberate defense. The enemy
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